Lost in the south of the China Sea, some small islands are the subject of a bitter dispute. The conflict of the archipelago of Spratly could be the cause of a destabilization of all Southeast Asia. My goal is to clear up this problem from a historical point of view to allow a better comprehension of the evolution of the conflict in the years to come.

• Geography of the Spratly islands
• History of the Spratly islands
• Stake of the Spratly islands
• Exits of the conflict
• Topicality
• Links and resources

The Spratly islands are located in the south of the China Sea, they are made up of a hundred small islands, atolls and other rocks. They are located at 400 miles at the east of Vietnam, 800 miles in the south of the Chinese island of Hainan, and 16 miles in the north of the island of Borneo.

Geographical co-ordinates : 8 38 N, 111 55 E

Surface : they occupy 70000 miles² of ocean but each island has a surface lower than 5 km².

Line of coast : 926 km

Climate : tropical

Lowest point : 0m

Highest point: 5m

Natural resources : abundant fish, hydrocarbon reserve (oil and gas mainly) supposed very vast. These islands are uninhabited any culture is impossible there, moreover Spratly are regularly swept by typhoons.

The importance of Spratly are not the islands themselves but the ocean which surrounds them. A "law of the sea" adopted in 1982 by the members of UNO stipulates the creation of the ZEE (Economic Exclusive Zones); this zone extends up to 200 miles nautical from the coasts from a country. Any country which declares a ZEE, according to article 56 of the treaty, can souverrainement explore and exploit the underwater basement, it has also the right to build artificial islands. The application of this law in Spratly shows that the control of a small island also involves the possession of a broad part of ocean. The problem is to define what differentiates an island from a rock; the treaty tries to exclude all the islands not capable of accomodating self-sufficing human dwellings; but in practice it is very difficult to observe this rule. From where this mad race for the possession of some rocks in the China Sea.

The history of the islands spratly (Chinese Nancha) goes up with the Chinese dynasty of Han where in 250 before J-C of the Chinese sailors would have discovered this archipelago then begun a beginning of colonization. Indeed it is possible to find some ruins of temples going back to this time on largest of these islands Itu Aba (Taiping)? But it is much less sure that the occupation was done in a continuous way by Chinese colonists.

After the fall of the Han, the Spratly islands were forgotten, except some notes on books of edge by Chinese sailors then European. In 1933 it French colonial government in Cochinchine annexes officially the whole of Spratly and the Paracels; not for a long time though, for in 1939 the world enters in war.

The Second World War and its consequences for Spratly

Imperial Japan very quickly understands the strategic importance of these islands. It thus establishes there a base for its submarines, thus the Japanese control all the China Sea of the south, from Singapore to Taiwan.

The world war hangs fine with the defeat of Japan in 1945, but whereas the fate of these small islands is not fixed yet by the international community, and in spite of the civil war which was at its peak in China, Guomingtang decides to reaffirm Chinese sovereignty by deploying some troops on largest of these islands Itu Aba (Taiping).

The Republic of China (Taiwan) has always maintained a garrison 400 men on this island. But this occupation has not made anybody react, even the Chinese Communists who after their victory in 1949 over Chang Kaichek did not worry about these small islands. In 1951 with the conference of San Francisco Japan officially gave up all its rights on Spratly, but no resolution was taken with regard to their attribution. The international community judges of no importance the fate of the archipelagoes, so they went then into oblivion little by little.

Beginnings of the conflict

In 1956, strange thing in the history of the international relations, a rich businessman Filipino, Thomas Cloma, asserts the possession of Spratly to his name. Even though his action did not have a continuation it shows us that all countries concerned, without deciding officially, had started to be interested closely with the fate of these islands.

After 13 years the problem of the Spratly islands re-appeared when in 1968 the Philippines occupy three small islands, the race for the islands has just begun. In 1973 whereas the communist threat always weighed on the South Vietnamese government, it decided however to send troops on 5 islands of Spratly but it also lost the control over the Paracels islands archipelago to the profit of China; these 5 lately acquired islands will fall to the hands of the Vietnamese Communists after the reunification of Vietnam.

Naval battle in the spratly

In the Eighties the conflict accelerated, all the countries bordering the Spratly islands wanted a share of the "cake". Moreover one started to speak about vast hydrocarbon reserves around Spratly. Malaysia occupies an island in 1983 then three in 1986.

But most significant in 1986 is the R.P. of China joining in the fight; initially indirectly by sending scientific boats to probe sea-beds then one year later the Chinese landed troops on Firey Cross and Cuarteron reef (see card), thus entering in direct conflict with Vietnam. China becomes increasingly aggressive, indeed on March 14, 1988, it decided to punish Vietnam (to have taken down a Chinese flag on one lately reclaimed island). A small naval battle then began, which will lead to the death of 80 sailors and the loss of three Vietnamese ships.

At the end of that year the score was of 21 islands for Vietnam, eight for the Philippines, six for China, three for Malaysia, one for Taiwan and 0 for Brunei. The tension of the Eighties reflected the cold war of it in Asia where Vietnam's ally USSR was opposed to China.

Signs of appeasement of the conflict 

After the fall of the Berlin Wall on the one hand and the events of the place Tian an' men on the other hand, the situation will calm down and talks even began to be heard about bilateral conferences for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The protagonist states consolidated their bases by building scientific and military structures (ports, airports...) on their islands, and agree to limit their expansion on Spratly at the time of the treaty of Manila. Nevertheless China occupied two new islands in 1992, then in 1995 built structures on an island located near Palawan (Mischief reef). The Philippines reacted by seizing the boats of Chinese fishermen and destroying these constructions. China did not lose hope and rebuilt these constructions in 1997, this time the Chinese prepared to hold a siege by building several forts on Mischief reef (cf. map). The Philippines noneager to re-enter in war with China protested against this violation of the treaty of Manila (1992).

Although these last years did not generate new wars, the countries seemed willing to maintain the statu quo, was this a peaceful beginning of resolution or the calms before the storm?

This short historical analysis leaves nevertheless a question outstanding: what are the facts that made these islands so important that 6 countries dispute them so bitterly? It is thus the stake of the conflict which will be developed in the third part of this essay.

As we have just seen it in the preceding part of this analysis, the Spratly islands are the subject of a tough argument for more than thirty years. Nevertheless the claims of the states concerned are not all identical.

China (and Taiwan for same the reasons) as Vietnam claim the totality of Spratly for historical reasons. The Philippines assert 60 islands, Malaysia only 6, whereas Brunei claims only Louisa reef (see card) who goes along his coasts. These three states advance the proximity of these islands for their claim. That in term of international law counts much more than the historical reasons.

The strategic position of Spratly

The achipel of Spratly could be only one geographical accident in the south of the China Sea only for they were on one of the more frequented maritime routes of the world.

Indeed more than 25% of the world production of oil crosses the detroit of Malaca (coming from the Middle East and bound for Japan and from the USA). Moreover the development of the Member States of the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asia Nations) depends on the maritime comunications of this area.

If a country is sovereign of the whole of Spratly it can legally suppress all the commercial traffic inside its territorial waters. It will not hold only the control of the economic exchanges of the ASEAN countries but also of the approvisionment of oil of Japan and part of the United States.

Rich mining resources of Spratly

The second fact which gives to Spratly such an importance is that all the states engaged in the argument are persuaded of the existence of a vast reserve of oil and natural gas surrounding the Spratly islands (17 million tons according to a Chinese source). The Member States of the ASEAN see in these resources the key of their economic development.

Thus Vietnam, which has one of the lowest GDP of the planet, has placed its growth on the exploitation of oil. In 1994 it has developed its own oil indutry and exploited the site of Bach Ho which represents a third of the total of its oil exports, moreover Vietnam with signed an agreement with the american company Mobil to exploit a concession around the Spratly islands. Vietnam was thus placed in a position where it cannot be allowed to give up its claims on the archipelago of Spratly.

Same situation for the Philippines where their growth depends to 95% on the oil imports, they also granted a licence to the american company Vaalco Energy to benefit from the resources located on Reed Bank (see card).

Brunei sees in the possession of Louisa reef the means of prolonging its oil resources which is becoming exhausted year by year. Taiwan and Malaysia did not sign yet an agreement of exploitation of Spratly but they well also hope to take part in the sharing of the black gold.

The point of view of the R.P. of China is different but it claims above all the possession of Spratly for preservation of the security of its territory. Nevertheless the Chinese specialists very quickly understood that the oil exploitation of Spratly will be able to replace that of Xinjiang once its reserve exhausted. This will allows the continuation of its strong economic development in the XXIe century. Moreover China proclaims being the only country able to exploit Spratly without resorting to foreign companies.

The presence of hydrocarbon thus gives to the conflict a whole new dimension. This resource is described as vital by the six countries for their economic development, so they are not ready to make concessions to reduce tensions in the area.

Risk of war 

In spite of the relative stability of the situation for a few years, it has been nevertheless impossible to draw aside the possibility of a war. As John Vasquez in his article " Steps to War" shows, the degeneration of a conflict in war is carried out according to four stages:

• Search for security
• Creation of alliance
• Arms race
• Escalation of the conflict

We saw above that the first stage has been reached since the Eighties, each state, except Brunei, showed its forces by occupying the most islands possible. The second point is more delicate here because the only possible alliance would be that of the ASEAN states against China, but the ASEAN alliance was defined during its creation as an economic and nonmilitary alliance. Moreover, countries like Singapore or Thailand have created close links with China.

The arms race is obvious in the area; the share of budget devoted to the military expenditure increased in all the receipts of the members of the ASEAN nations. As for China it carries out a project of modernization of its navy having for objective to be able to project a military force on all the oceans. Its goal being to take and preserve Spratly what for the moment is impossible due to the absence of any aircraft carrier.

It is thus clear that the risk of war is quite real it does miss only the match to set fire at the powders, this one is highly very likely to be the acquisition of an aircraft carrier by China. Nevertheless one should not forget, all the committed countries undertook discussions to lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. But will that be sufficient? it will be studied in the 4th part of this essay: Resolution of the Conflict.

In order to avoid new fatal confrontations as in 1988, the protagonists undertook at the beginning of the Nineties a series of conferences.

The role of the ASEAN nations in the negotiations

The ASEAN has started many intergovernmental meetings. Its principal element is FRA (Regional Forum of the ASEAN) which gathers together since 1994 members of the ASEAN, plus 7 significant economic partners (the USA, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Australia, New Zelande and European Union) plus 4 observers (Russia, China, Laos and New Guinea). This organization has the advantage of joining together all the countries concerned around a negotiation table but its too official character deprives it of effectiveness. One year before was created two groups of studies for a peaceful resolution of the conflict: ASEAN ISIS (Institute of Strategic and International Studies) and CSCAP (Council for Security and Co-operation in Asia). They are both composed of experts (lawyers, militaries, scientists...) representing their government, but their meetings have more a private character. Thus their work is in the beginning many proposals which for more than 5 years have made evolve the conflict to a peaceful outcome.

Indonesia as mediator

Neutral country in the Spratly conflict (its sovereignty on Natuna not being disputed), Indonesia tries since 1990 to reconcile the protagonists around a common agreement.

Ali Alatas Iindonesia's Foreign Minister thus organized a series of conferences joining together the 6 countries concerned plus Thailand, Singapore and Laos which has no sea access. Indonesia shows thus that the stability of all Southeast Asia depends on the peaceful resolution of this conflicts.

At the time of the sessions an agreement was found - the states are not named - to make representatives of continental China and Taiwan sit at the same table. Indonesia has a great experience of international conflicts in connection with the exploitation of sea-beds. Indeed this one would like that the belligerants adopt a treaty which would be based on the model of the Timor Gap Treaty (agreement between Indonesia and Australia for the joint hydrocarbon explotation in the water asserted by both countries). Its goal is thus to separate the strategic part (control of the islands) of the economic part (mineral resources); thus by resolving the second conflict it hopes that the belligerants will attach less importance to the control of Spratly and by there will reduce énormously the regional tensions. However this vision runs up has two large difficulties: the first is there put in agreement of six countries asks much time (Timor Treaty Gap with only two béligérents was negotiated during 7 years), the second, of my opinion, most significant is that the vision indonésienne runs up against the Chinese intransigence which considers the control of Spratly above all like a necessity for the security of its country.

Nevertheless the conferences led in 1992 has the agreement of Manila, where the countries are committed not to use force for the control of new islands. Even if China did not respect this agreement (and continues to ignore it by building fortifications on Mischief Reef) this constituted a great step in the projection of the conflict towards a peaceful resolution.

Large efforts were thus made to peacefully find an agreement with the conflict of Spratly but the more time this is taking, and the more imbalance between China and the countries of the ASEAN grows; moreover the Chinese intransigence blocks all the decision-makings at the time of negociations.

May 23, 1999

A Chinese fishing vessel cast and two others endomagés it is the assessment of the last fixing in Spratly with broad of Mischief Reef. Nothing indicates that the Philippines are responsible for this incident nevertheless one can fear an increase in the tensions in the area; indeed whereas the China relations - the USA are with lowest (business of espionage and bombardment of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade), the Philippines have just joined again their engagement of military co-operation with the navy americaine (cancelled in 1992). Joint exercises will thus take place at broad coasts of Palawan. This return of the States Unis in the China Sea of the South is very badly seen by Beijing whose supremacy is likely to be disputed.

source: The Economist May 29, 1999

January 13, 1999

The Minister for Defence of the Philippines Orlando Mercado declared at the time of his visit in the USA which China was opposed to all discussions concerning the Spratly islands. Thus China wants to protest against the fact that the Philippines seek the support of the international community for its claims at sea of China of the South.

source: BBC world Service

November 15, 1998

In a given interview national television the president of the Philippines Joseph Estrada has proposes held it of a conference on Spratly. He affirmed that the conflict of Spratly could be solved only by one diplomatic agreement. The president wants to thus join again the dialogue with China after the incidents of the last month. He moreover ensured than the navy of its country did not receive the command to draw on the Chinese boats in the disputed zone.